Basic Definitions
For the purpose of motivating the definitions which follow, consider this (fabricated) ' Such a computer virus can easily be created using a program scheme (in an ad hoc language) similar to that found in [Col] f With the 'case study virus' and all of those which could be created by the scheme above, it appears that the following properties are relevant:
1. For every program, there is an 'infected' form of that program. That is, it is possible t o think of the virus as a map from programs to ('infected') programs.
2.
Each infected program on each input (where here by input is meant all 'accessible' information: e.g. the user's input, the system's clock, files containing data or programs) makes one of three choices:
Injure:
Ignore the 'intended' task and compute some other function. Note that in the case study, which inputs result in injury (i.e. those where the system clock indicates that the date is Jan. 1, 1990 or later) , and what kind of injury occurs (file deletion) are the same whether the infected program is a text editor or a compiler or something else. Thus which inputs result in injury and what form the injury takes is independent of which infected program is running and is actually dependent solely on the virus itself.
Perform the 'intended' task and if it halts, infect programs. Notice in particular that the clock, the user/prograin communications and all other 'accessible' information other than programs, are handled just as they would have been had the uninfected version of the program been run. Further, notice that whether the infected program is a text editor or a compiler or something else, when it infects a program the resulting infected program is the same, Thus the infected form of a program is independent of which infected program produces the infection.
Neither injure nor infect. Perform the 'intended' task without modification. This ma3 be thought of as a special case of 'Infect', where the number of programs getting infected is zero. (In the case study, imitation only occurs when no programs are accessible for infection).
Infect:
Imitate:
A formal definition of computer virus is presented next. 
FOT all partial f
: N 3 N , f o r all i, j E N , f ( i 7 j ) denotes f ( < i, j >). 8 . FOT all partial f : N -, N , for all n E N , write f ( n ) 1 i . f f ( n ) is defined. 9. For alIpartialf : N + N , f o r a l l n E N , write f(n) T i#f(n) is
Definition 7 FOT all Glide1 numberings of the partial recursive functions {4;}, for all viruses v with respect t o {&}:
v i s benign iff both: 
is pathogenic with respect to v and j ] ( V j E N ) [ v ( j ) is not contagious with respect to v and j ]
v is disseminating i f l both:
is not pathogenic with respect to z1 and j ]
( 3 j E N ) [ v ( j ) is contagious with respect to v and j ]
v is malicious i f l both:
with respect to v and j ] ( 3 j E N)[v(j) is contagious with respect to v and j ]
The next theorem records some simple facts about types of viruses.
Theorem 1 For all Go'del numberings of the partial recursive functions (4;)
for all viruses v with respect t o {$;}: All other parts follow immediately from the definitions.
Thus, all programs infected by a benign virus are benignant with respect t o their uninfected predecessors. They function just as if they had never been infected. Viruses in this class appear to be the least threatening. This class includes many 'degenerate' viruses such as the identity function and 'padding' functions.
Programs infected by a n Epeian virus can only be benignant or Trojan horses with respect t o their uninfected predecessors. Further the latter option must sometimes occur. Epeian viruses will not be able to spread themselves; however, an infected program may imitate the 'intended' task of its uninfected predecessor until some 'trigger' causes it to do damage. Among the Epeian viruses are the 'degenerate' class of constant functions, which never imitate-or-infect b u t only injure.
Programs infected by a disseminating viruses can only be benignant or carriers with respect t o their uninfected predecessors. Further the latter option must sometimes occur. Thus programs infected with such viruses are never pathogenic. However, it is worth noting that disseminating viruses m a y modXy the size of programs or their complexity characteristics, and by this means become detectable or cause harm (or benefit as in the case of the compression virus). In fact, size and complexity may be important properties when considering viruses. An extension of the current theory to account for size and complexity seems appropriate (see $further research).
Malicious viruses can both spread and produce injuries. They appear to be the most threatening kind of virus. The 'case study virus To establish that T 51 V, let j E V (for example let j be an index for the identity function) and consider the function g : N 4 N such that for all i, y E N :
Then g is a partial recursive function. Let k be an index for g, and let f : N 4 N , be such that:
where s is as in the s -m -n theorem [Ro] .
Then f is a total recursive function and:
Thus T Srn V. It follows, as in $7.2 [Ro] , that T 51 V as desired.
To establish that V E IIa, consider the following formula for V which arises directly from the definition of virus:
Where H is a 'step counting' predicate for {q$} such that:
And where L is a predicate for ( 4 , ) such that:
Since for all acceptable G6del numberings of the partial recursive functions (4,) it is easily seen t h a t there exist recursive predicates H and L as above, it follows that V E II2.
Thus detecting viruses is quite intractable, and it seems unlikely that protection systems predicated on virus detection will be successful.
Isolation As A Protection Strategy
As noted in [Col] isolating a computing environment from its surroundings is a powerful method of protecting it from viruses. For example, if no new programs can be introduced, no old programs can be updated, and no communication can occur, then it seems viruses a r e no threat.
Unfortunatly, such isolation is unrealistic in many computing environments.
The next theorems explore the possibility of protecting computing environments with less severe forms of isolation.
Definition 8 For all Go'del numberings of the partial recursive functions {di}, for all viruses v with respect to {&}, let:
The infected set of v Proof trivial.
Thus the case study virus, as implemented using the scheme in $basic definitions would be absolutely isolable. In fact, what little experience with viruses there is to date seems t o suggest that in practice people who produce viruses begin by producing ones with the increasing property necessary for theorem 3 to apply. Unfortunately, not all viruses have this property. For example, with any reasonable compression scheme, the compression virus of $ basic definitions would not have this property. Nonetheless, the compression virus is absolutely isolable. Given a program with the proper syntax, it is in the infected set if and only if decompressing the compressed part results in a legitimate program.
Is every virus absolutely isolable?
Regretably, the next theorem shows that the answer is no. Go'del where y is the least natural number such that, for all i', z' E N with < i', X' ><< i, z > l j 2 ( i f , 3 ' ) < j l ( i , 3).
Theorem 4 For all
Then j 2 is a monotonically increasing total recursive function and by (l) , it follows that: Then by standard arguments, b1 is a total recursive function and:
Let bz : N + N be such that for all i, k E N:
Then ba is a total recursive function and it follows from (2) and (3) that:
Applying the s-m-n theorem there exists a total recursive function g such that for all i, k E N :
By the recursion theorem, there exists an h E N such that for all i E N :
Let v = 4 h . Then v is a total recursive function since bz is.
Let d , p E S, then using t h a t fact that v = $h is a total recursive function and applying (4) gives:
1 of the theorem now follows directly from the definition of malicious virus.
Since, for all total recursive functions m, Rg(m) is recursively enumerable, it follows that I,, = R g ( v ) E El.
Let c : N -+ N be such that for all z E N , C(Z) = j2(bl(l,h),z). Since j 2 is Since j 2 is 1 -1, it follows that z = f(y) E K . je, Hence, K the theorem holds.
I, and 2 of Thus, for the viruses described in the previous theorem, protection cannot be based upon deciding whether a particular program is infected or not. Paradoxically, despite this, it is often possible to defend against such viruses. How such a defense could be mounted will be described below; however, a few definitions are in order first.
Definition 10 FOT all Go'del numberings of the partial recursive functions {&), for all viruses v with respect t o {q$}, let:
The germ set of v Thus the germs of a virus are functionally the same as infected programs, but are syntactically different. They can infect programs, but cannot result from infection. They may start 'epidemics', but are never propagated with them.
Definition 11 FOT all Go'del numberings of the partial recursive functions { 4 i } ,
for all virzlses v with respect t o {4,}, v is isolable within its germ set ifl there exists an S C N such that:
Notice that if a virus is isolable within its germ set by a decidable set S, then not allowing programs in the set S to be written to storage or to be communicated will stop the virus from infecting. Further, the isolation of some uninfected germs by this process appears to be an added benefit.
Returning now to the viruses described in the previous theorem: assume that the function bl above had the property that for all i , k , b l ( i , k ) >< i , k >.
The proof of the previous theorem could easily have been modified to assure this. Further, in Godel numberings derived in the usually fashion from natural programming languages, a bl constructed in a straightforward manner would have this property. Consider the set By the monotonically increasing property of j z and the property of bl which is being assumed, S is decidable. On the other hand i f a E I, then there exists i such that
And it follows that a E S. On the other hand if a E S then there exist a n y,z such that By (2) and (4):
And hence a E G, as desired.
Thus viruses like the ones in theorem 4 demonstrate that decidability of I, is sufficient but not necessary for neutralization. Apparently, more work needs to be done before a clear idea of the value of isolation will emerge. Are all viruses isolable within their germ set? The answer is no (proof omitted). Are all disseminating viruses isolable within their germ set? The answer is not known. Are there notions of isolation which provide significant protection at a reasonable cost?
Further Research
The study of computer viruses is embryonic. Since so little is known, virtually any idea seems worth exploring.
Listed below are a few avenues for further investigation.
Complexity theoretic and program size theoretic aspects of computer viruses.
Introduce complexity theory and program size theory into the study of computer viruses. This is only a partial definition because some notion of 'connectivity' is needed. That is, the union of two p-viruses, neither of which 'evolves' into the other should not be a p-virus. Many definitions of 'connectivity' can be defined, but further study will be required to choose those which are most appropriate. Once an appropriate choice is made, an important question will be whether the set of infected indices of a p-virus can be harder t o detect than those of a virus.
Computer Organisms.
This issue has evolved during joint work with K. Kompells.
There appear t o be programs which can reproduce or reproduce and injure but which are not viruses (e.g. programs which just make copies of themselves but never 'infect'). These 'computer organisms' may be a serious security problem.
It may be appropriate to study 'computer organisms' and treat 'computer viruses' as special case.
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